Outsourced Banking Operations Crippled After Vendor Ransomware Event
The Challenge
In January 2025, Bridgeway Financials online banking operations came to a standstill following a ransomware attack, not on its own network, but on the managed services vendor that hosted its back-office infrastructure. The attack encrypted key databases, disrupted transaction processing, and left customers locked out of their accounts for more than 72 hours. Automated payments failed, contact centers were overwhelmed, and media coverage intensified as clients voiced frustration over the outage.
While Bridgeway’s internal systems remained uncompromised, the event exposed the fragility of its outsourcing arrangements. The vendor had not properly segmented client environments, allowing the malware to spread across multiple financial institutions. Bridgeway’s service level agreement contained no detailed cybersecurity or recovery obligations, and leadership had accepted vendor assurances without verifying technical controls or business continuity readiness. Regulators classified the outage as a reportable incident under PIPEDA due to the temporary unavailability of customer account data.
The disruption revealed an uncomfortable truth: outsourcing core operations without adequate oversight transferred operational risk, but not accountability.
Our Solution
Our crisis response team was mobilized within hours of the outage. We coordinated communication between Bridgeway, the vendor, regulators, and impacted clients to ensure transparency. Immediate containment efforts included verifying data integrity, securing backup infrastructure, and confirming there had been no data exfiltration. Once systems were restored, we launched a full vendor risk reform program.
The new framework required every third-party vendor to undergo independent cybersecurity audits, share resilience reports, and maintain insurance coverage commensurate with their service criticality. Service contracts were rewritten to define incident response roles, recovery time objectives, encryption standards, and breach notification timelines. Bridgeway adopted a multi-vendor redundancy strategy for critical functions to ensure continuity even if one provider suffered an outage.
To validate these controls, we introduced biannual tabletop exercises involving both Bridgeway and its service providers, simulating ransomware and network disruption scenarios to test coordinated responses.
The Value
Bridgeway emerged from the crisis with stronger operational resilience and a renewed commitment to transparency. Regulators and clients praised the company’s open communication and rapid remediation efforts. The institution avoided penalties and prevented customer attrition by offering compensation credits and proactive status updates throughout the incident.
The reforms fundamentally changed how Bridgeway viewed vendor relationships, transforming them from transactional contracts into strategic partnerships based on shared accountability. The company now treats vendor cybersecurity as an extension of its own defense, ensuring that resilience is built into every level of its supply chain.
Implementation Roadmap
1. Conduct vendor dependency and business impact audit
2. Update contracts to define cybersecurity obligations and recovery benchmarks
3. Establish multi-vendor redundancy for mission-critical systems
4. Require regular independent cybersecurity audits from all providers
5. Conduct joint incident response and recovery simulations

